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The historical background of
Turkish-Iranian relations
The history of relations between Turkey and Iran can be dated back to the sixteenth
century,  when  two  competing  imperial  systems,  the  Ottomans  and  the  Safavids,
consolidated their rulership over the respective countries. Turkey and Iran were both
former imperial centres, and the modern states established in these two countries are
considered successors to the Ottoman and the Safavid imperial rule that had dominated
most parts of Western Asia for centuries. 
Many  historians,  however,  have  been  inclined  to  attribute  the  history  of  Turkish-
Iranian relations to earlier centuries, because the two peoples knew each other long
before the migration of Turkic tribes into Asia Minor. The early encounters between
the  two  peoples  gradually  evolved  into  the  rise  of  a  distinctive  ‘Turco-Iranian
civilisation’ that spread into much of Western Asia through the tenth to thirteenth
centuries.1 The  Turco-Iranian  cultural  synthesis  gradually  faded  away  with  the
westward  march  of  the  Ottomans,  whereas  the  Safavids  engaged  in  crafting  a
distinctive sectarian identity in their dominions. 
As the nearby imperial systems, territorial and political conflicts prevailed over the
Ottoman-Safavid relations against interval periods of peace.  However,  the Ottoman-
Safavid rivalry and military conflicts were very intensive throughout the sixteenth and
the  early  seventeenth  centuries,  when  both  imperial  systems  were  committed  to
expanding  their  suzerainty.  The  imperial  wars  mostly  revolved  around  the  fertile
territories of Mesopotamia and the Caucasus. Competition for the control of the trade
routes passing through the aforementioned regions was also an important aspect of
that rivalry. After the Safavids consolidated their authority over Iran at the turn of the
sixteenth century and established Twelver Shiism as the ‘official’ creed, sectarian rifts
coloured the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry. On the one side, the Safavids tempted to mobilise
the  Turkmen  tribes  of  Anatolia  that  remained  sympathetic  to  the  religious  order,
Safawiye,  which consisted of militant Shiite dervishes (Qizilbash) headed by Safavid
Shah Ismail,  against  the  Ottoman rule.  On the other  side,  the  Ottomans positioned
themselves as the protectors of the orthodox, Sunni, understanding of Islam against the
“Qizilbash heretics”. The Ottomans under Sultan Selim I, fought Shah Ismail in 1514, at
The historical background of Turkish-Iranian relations
Turkey-Iran Relations after the JDP
1
the Battle of Chalderan. Before the battle, Sultan Selim obtained religious fatwas from
the well-known ulama of the time, in order to sanctify the war against the Qizilbashs,
who were regarded as heretics threatening Islam.2
Actually, the Chalderan battle was the first of a dozen of long-lasting wars between the
two  empires,  in  which  the  hold  of  most  Caucasian  and  Mesopotamian  territories
including Tabriz and Baghdad was altered numerous times. The history of territorial
and religious conflicts with the Ottomans was inherited by the successors of the Safavid
dynasty, Nader Shah, Karim Han Zand and the Qajars. It is noteworthy that Nader Shah
attempted  to  diminish  the  religious  differences  between  the  two  countries,  which
ultimately failed due to Ottoman rejection of his offers. However, as an outcome of the
decreasing imperial powers of both the Ottomans and the successive Iranian rulers in
the  eighteenth  century,  the  competition  between  the  two  parties  settled  down.
Consequently, the Ottoman-Iranian fronts remained stable based on the Treaty of Qasr-
e  Shirin/Zuhab  dated  1639.  The  boundaries  specified  by  that  treaty  virtually
constituted contemporary borders  between Iran and Turkey.  For this  reason,  many
diplomats of both sides remember that treaty as the foundation of the centuries old
friendship between the two countries. 
The history of the conflicts, which either originated for imperial-geopolitical reasons,
or  from  sectarian  differences,  shaped  general  perceptions  on  Ottoman-Safavid
relations.  However,  the  Ottoman-Safavid  confrontation  did  not  prevent  cultural
transactions between Ottoman Turkey and Iran. There was mutual affection between
the two people  over  a  wide array of  art  and culture  from literature,  and music  to
architecture. Iranian scholars, artists and literary men were welcomed to the Ottoman
palace. Additionally, the two imperial administrations were heavily influenced by each
other in terms of political and military organisation. Finally, the Ottoman and Safavid
diplomatic exchanges, including letters of praise and gifts at times of peace, displayed
the close affinity between the two ruling dynasties.3 
Having  lost  their  imperial  grandeur  due  to  the  military  and  economic  advance  of
Western colonialist powers and the Russian Tsardom, to the detriment of Iranian and
the Ottoman territories, led both countries to embark on the process of modernisation
in  the  nineteenth  century.  Sectarian  differences  and the  imperial  competition  that
shaped  Ottoman-Iranian  relations  was  eclipsed  by  the  common  challenges  of
imperialism, and the modernity that preoccupied decision-makers in both countries.
Furthermore, the Ottoman attempts for modernisation were regarded as a model for
the  Iranian  modernisers  and  paved  the  ground for  improvements  in  the  Ottoman-
Iranian  relationship.  Moreover,  Qajar  Shahs  Naser  al-Din  and  Mozaffar  al-Din  paid
official  visits  to  Istanbul,  respectively  in  1873  and 1900,  as  a  part  of  their  trips  to
Europe, where they were warmly received.4 Eventually, this period witnessed intensive
intellectual, political and economic exchanges between the two countries. Istanbul then
became a centre for Iranian intellectuals  and tradesmen. There was also a growing
affinity  between  political  dissidents  of  the  two  monarchies  that  supported
constitutionalist  movements  in  both  countries.5 Even  the  Ottoman  ambassador  to
Tehran engaged in correspondence between the dissidents and the Shah at the turn of
the constitutional revolution in Iran.
Ottoman troops were mobilised inside the Iranian territories throughout WWI, but this
was not for the sake of territorial expansion, or in pursuit of a sectarian goal. As part of
its  war  strategy  of  waging  jihad  to  steer  Muslim  believers  against  the  British  and
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Russian  imperialists,  the  Union  and  Progress  Party  leaders  in  power  at  that  time
intended to confront British and Russian advances in Iran, keep its territorial integrity
and turn it into an ally. For a while, Ottoman forces, in coordination with Germany,
supported  the  Provisional  National  Government  based  in  Kermanshah  in  1915.
However, the government collapsed in the face of Russian advances.6 It was surprising
for the Ottomans that the Iranian foreign minister made territorial demands at the
Paris Conference of 1919 that convened to arrange post-war settlements, for eastern
Anatolia including Diyarbakır and Mosul, which were rejected by the British delegation.
7 
The  emergence  of  Western-oriented nation-states  in  Turkey  and Iran in  the  1920s,
under the leadership of M. Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah Pahlavi, facilitated further
cooperation between the two countries. The rise of secular and nationalist regimes in
both  countries  narrowed  the  dominance  of  sectarian  differences  between  the  two.
However,  the  rise  of  nationalism  in  both  countries  unleashed  a  new  challenge  in
bilateral relations: the question of ethnicities or nationalities. Especially, in parallel to
the rise of Pan-Turkism at the turn of the century, although it was curbed by Kemalist
Turkey, some Turkish nationalists paid particular attention to the cause of ‘the Iranian
Turks,’  which heightened Iran’s  security  concerns.  On the  other  hand,  the  Kurdish
uprisings across the Turkish-Iranian border that had begun in the 1920s, and Iranian
government’s  lenience  towards  the  Kurdish militants,  discomforted Turkish leaders
with relation to Iran.8 Nonetheless, the two countries under the leadership of Atatürk
and Reza Shah overcame the challenges and developed a good neighbourly affiliation.
Having  consolidated  their  political  regimes,  Ankara  and  Tehran  demarcated  their
borders,  and  signed  a  friendship  agreement.  Reza  Shah’s  visit  to  Turkey  in  1934
displayed the growing friendly relationship between the two countries. First of all, both
leaders  denounced  both  the  imperialist  and  sectarian  claims  of  their  predecessors.
Instead,  they  were  primarily  preoccupied  with  building  nations  and  modern  states
across  their  respective  territories.  Additionally,  the  British influence  in  the  Middle
East, and the Soviet control over the Caucasus, deterred Turkey and Iran from reviving
expansionist claims, and left them as ‘status quo powers’ committed to preserving their
sovereignty and territorial integrity. A series of tribal revolts on the frontiers of both
countries led them, alongside Afghanistan and Iraq, to sign a non-aggression (Sadabad)
treaty. Accordingly, the parties agreed to prevent in their respective territories ‘the
formation and activities of armed bands, associations or organisations to subvert the
established institutions, or disturb the order or security of any part, whether situated
on  the  frontier  or  elsewhere,  of  the  territory  of  another  Party,  or  to  change  the
constitutional system of such other Party.’9
Amicable  relations  between  the  two  countries  were  furthered  after  WWII.  As  an
illustration  of  good-neighbourly  relations,  an  Iran-Turkey  Friendship  Society  was
established in Istanbul in late 1952. Turkish President Celal Bayar visited Tehran in
September 1955, which was reciprocated by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s visit to
Ankara in May 1956. At that time, the perceived Soviet threat and the fear of the spread
of communism led both Turkey and Iran to enter security relations with the United
States. As the two leading US allies in the Middle East, Turkey and Iran headed the
establishment  of  the  Baghdad  Pact  in  1955,  which  later  turned  into  CENTO.
Additionally,  both  countries,  alongside  Pakistan,  established  the  Organisation  for
Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964.10 That period was one of the most
brilliant for Turkish-Iranian relations. In addition to political and security affiliations,
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economic and cultural relations between the two countries considerably improved. The
two  countries  abolished  visa  requirements  for  travel  purposes,  signed  a  trade
agreement,  and  engaged  in  connecting  their  railways  and  highways  within  the
framework of RCD. Ankara and Tehran signed a cultural cooperation agreement in 1959
that came into force in 1966. Accordingly, the Iranian Cultural House was opened in
Ankara, and academic exchange programs were launched between the two countries.
The  Turkish  postal  agency  issued  special  stamps  to  celebrate  the  so-called  ‘2500th
Anniversary of the Iranian Monarchy’s Foundation’ in 1971 that highlighted the close
relationship between Ankara and Tehran. Despite the growing ties between the two
countries, Turkey-Iran relations failed to turn into a full-fledged partnership, either
because  of  the  different  geostrategic  priorities  of  both  capitals,  or  an  underlying
mistrust between the leaders. Moreover, domestic turmoil in respective countries in
the late 1970s prevented them from furthering their ties.11 Ostensible attempts of the
parties to develop economic and trade ties between the two countries failed to produce
a breakthrough. In addition to the structural characteristics of the economies of Turkey
and  Iran,  substitute  import  development  programs of  both  parties  prevented  the
development of trade relations, aside from the logistical transitionary role of Turkey to
connect Iran and Europe. After the rise of oil prices in the mid-1970s, the volume of
trade between Turkey and Iran slightly increased in favour of Iran.12 Even then, the
total amount of trade between the two countries remained at negligible levels, i.e. less
than fifty million dollars.13
By  the  late  1970s,  when  the  Pahlavi  monarchy  was overthrown  by  the  ‘Islamic’
revolution, it was difficult to discern continuing patterns of accord between Iran and
Turkey. In a quick review of five hundred years of bilateral relations between the two
nations in order to trace continuity and change in Turkish-Iranian relations, one could
find,  at  best,  a  complicated relationship.  This  history of  a  complicated relationship
denies both the myth of continuous confrontation that dates back to the Chalderan
battle,  and the myth of eternal Turkish-Iranian amity that dates back to the Qasr-e
Shirin  treaty.  That  is,  the  history  of  bilateral  relations  between  Turkey  and  Iran
revolved around a ‘fine line between friendly competition and fierce
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